No control—the absence of choice in the present moment?

[Elohim]

Everyone,

To begin with, there was a discussion (http://www.lioncity.net/buddhism/index.php?showtopic=39696&st=0) about decision-making from the Abhidhamma standpoint on another forum, and someone said, “There is also no real control—you and your actions are all conditioned, the consequence of kammic accumulations ... i.e. the result of everything (all causes and conditions) which has come before."

I thought that perhaps I had simply misunderstood the wording here, but I did not think that it was correct to say that there is no control, or that our actions were solely the result of what has come before. When stated like this, it appeared to me to represent the Jain's doctrine of kamma in that it did not account for present intentions. If absolutely everything were the result of the past, liberation would not be possible.

As far as I understand this concept, the experience of the five aggregates is the result of past kamma, and whatever is done with body, speech, or mind is present kamma (SN 35.145 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.145.than.html)). Even though the world of our experience is conditioned, the Buddha — as far as I understand him — taught that there is an element of control in the present moment.

Essentially, not only did the Buddha refute the Jain's idea of kamma (MN 101 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.101.than.html)), which stated that whatever a person experiences — pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain — all is caused by what was done in the past, but he often stressed the importance of self-control due to the consequences of our actions (Dhp. 9-10 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.01.than.html)) (MN 41 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.041.nymo.html)) (MN 136 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.136.nymo.html)) (SN 10.12 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn10/sn10.012.than.html)).

While I was certainly not trying to suggest that there was a self somewhere in this equation, it begged to ask the question, if there were absolutely no element of control involved at all, what would be the purpose of such teachings? Logically speaking, if we were unable to exert any control in the present whatsoever, with our experiences being completely conditioned by past kamma alone, we would have to burn off our old kamma to escape samsara.

However, when I inquired as to what allows for the possibility of choice in the present moment, I was told by the Venerable Dhammanando that there was nothing. An example that I was given was a mosquito bites you on the nose, you feel annoyed and want to squash it, but then you recall that you're a precept-observing Buddhist and so restrain yourself. When this event is described in conventional terms, or according to the Sutta method, it might be said that you had a choice to kill the mosquito or to refrain, and that you chose the latter. But when it is described according to the Abhidhamma method, your abstention from killing was not due to choice but to the arising of kusala cetasikas (wholesome mental factors) such as moral shame and fear of wrong-doing (hiri & ottappa), and abstinence (virati).

There were many other examples that other people offered to me, including a passage from the Dhammasangani (pp. 7-8):

What on that occasion is volition (cetanaa)? The volition, purpose, purposefulness, which is born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection - that is the volition that there then is.


As well as from the Atthasalini, pp.147-148:

Volition is that which co-ordinates, that is, it binds closely (abhisandahati) to itself associated states as objects. This is its characteristic; its function is conation. There is no such thing as volition in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of co-ordinating; all volition has it. But the function of conation is only in moral and immoral states; as regards activity in moral and immoral acts, the remaining associated states play only a restricted part. But volition is exceedingly energetic. It makes double effort, double exertion. Hence the Ancients said: 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who, taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength, he doubled his effort, and said, "Take your sickles," and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' Volition is like the cultivator; the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, double effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts. Thus should conation as its function be understood.

It has directing as manifestation. It arises directing associated states, like the chief disciple, the chief carpenter, etc., who fulfil their own and others' duties...even so, when volition starts work on its object, it sets associated states to do each its own work. For when it puts forth energy, they also put forth energy...It is also evident that it arises by causing associated states to be energetic in such things as recollecting an urgent work and so forth.

It was also mentioned that the Patthana goes into enormous detail about the 24 paccaya (conditions)—some of which are past and some present. Nevertheless, according to these people, even the present ones do not simply arise out of nothing. Nor do they arise because "I" want them to. The processes of mind are happening at enormous speed and there is no "person" who can do anything to stop them or change them. Even the cittas that are arising at this moment are conditioned by previous cittas as well as well as by other conditions that are present at the same time.

The basic gist of everything was apparently pointing towards the refutation that there is an agent that acts, that in the present moment, citta arises accompanied by cetasika. These arise together, each having its function. These fall away, conditioning the next complex, this arises immediately without a gap. With each having its own function, citta and the accompanying mental factors "perform" these functions. The consciousness of the moment has its own flavor, as it were, given the combination and nature of its constituents, which arise together with it by conditions.

In essence, what they were saying was that there is no khandha under our control (MN 35 (http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima1/035-culasaccaka-sutta-e1.html)); therefore, there is no control. In addition, since this takes into account past kamma as well as present kamma, both being conditioned and further conditioning the present moment, it is not guilty of the Jain's wrong view of kamma. When put into those words, it does make sense to me, however, I still feel like something is missing here. To me, it sounds as if our development along the path would be coincidental at best. Since there is no element of control or choice involved, we would essentially have to be lucky enough to stumble onto the appropriate conditions for our spiritual advancement.

Even though this appears to fall under the dreaded conventional versus ultimate framework, and I understand that I am seeing these concepts through a fair amount of confusion, I wonder if I am missing something important here. I was hoping that some of you might be willing to share some of your thoughts on this with me.

Sincerely,

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

Everyone,

While I was certainly not trying to suggest that there was a self somewhere in this equation, it begged to ask the question, if there were absolutely no element of control involved at all, what would be the purpose of such teachings? Logically speaking, if we were unable to exert any control in the present whatsoever, with our experiences being completely conditioned by past kamma alone, we would have to burn off our old kamma to escape samsara.



About two years ago, when I was reading a lot of material on OBEs and trying to assess where the current trends in the study of the brain were going with regard to the mind/consciousness, it dawned on me (and rather humorously) that if the actor or the attakara (you may call it consciousness) were simply a passive epiphenomenon, we would have one heck of a problem. We would be living in an Alice in bizarre world.

Imagine as a young male you are walking down the street. Your body senses the body of a young female who is in estrus. Your body then lunges out for her body. As the passive, witness consciousness—which is just an epiphenomenon according to some of our great scientists—you passively watch as your body takes liberties with the young female's body. When it is all done, the consciousness excuses the body, then walks away. There is no arrest because the law states that the body is principle wherease consciousness, which the brain makes, can only manage to witness having no control over the body or the brain.


Love ya'll,

Bobby

[fofoo]

While not being able to make an in-depth assesment if the conclusion from the Abhidhamma are correct,I want to note that even if it were true on the ultimate level, when taking it to convential level, must reflect the conventional truth of the Buddha that says:

23. 1. 7.

(7) Hetu Ý Reasons

1. I heard thus. At one time the Blessed One was living in the monastery offered by Anàthapiõóika in Jeta's grove in Sàvatthi.

2. The Blessed One addressed the monks from there: ßMonks, conscious of what, grasping and settling in what, arise the view, `There is no cause and reason for the defilement of beings. Beings are defiled without a reason. And without cause and reason beings are purified. There is no power, effort, manly stability, and manly achievement. All beings, living things, the born lively things are carried along to maturity together and experience pleasantness and unpleasantness in the six spheres of contact without help, power, or effort.

3. ßVenerable sir, the Blessed One is the leader for the Teaching, hearing it from the Blessed One the monks will bear it in mind.

4. ßMonks, conscious of matter, grasping and settling in matter, arises the view, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'.

5-7. ßMonks, conscious of feelings, perceptions, and intentions, grasping and settling in them arise the view, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'.

8. ßMonks, mindfully grasping and settling in consciousness arises the view, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'.

9. ßMonks, is matter permanent or impermanent?û

ßVenerable sir, it is impermanent.û

....

Adhering they are impermanent, unpleasant, changing would the view arise, `There is no cause ... re ... power or effort'?û

ßThat is not so, venerable sir.û

15. ßMonks, when the learned noble disciple has dispelled doubts in these six instances, his doubts about unpleasantness, its arising, ceasing, and the method for the ceasing of unpleasantness too are dispelled. Monks, to this is said the noble disciple has entered the stream of the Teaching. He would not fall from there and his single aim would be enlightenment.û



From SN 23.1" Diññhi Saüyutta (Beliefs and views) (http://www.greatwesternvehicle.org/pali/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/3Samyutta-Nikaya/Samyutta3/23-Ditthi-Samyutta/01-Sotapattivaggo-e.htm)

Interestingly, "effort" is translated as willpower (Willenskraft) in my German version of the sutta. As far as I know, the above view( under 2, marked bold.) was the teaching of Makkhali Gosala, which was dismissed by the Buddha

Regards.

[fofoo]

Just to let you know if interested. Even Nyanaponika , who probalby had some decent knowledge of the Abhidhamma, uses the following terms when addressing the general audience ( I know that we are in 202, just for information):


... lehrt der Buddha eine autonome Ethik der Selbstverantwortung und inneren Läuterung, die eine mitfühlende Verantwortung gegenüber dem Mitmenschen einschließt.

... the Buddha teaches an autonomous ethic of self responsibility and internal refinement which includes an compassionate responsibility for one`s fellows


Taken from the preface of Anguttara Nikāya , translated from the Pali to German by Nyanatiloka,published by Nyanaponika 3. Vorwort des Herausgebers zur 4. überarbeiteten Auflage (http://www.palikanon.com/angutt/a00.htm)

Regards

[fofoo]

However, when I inquired as to what allows for the possibility of choice in the present moment, I was told by the Venerable Dhammanando that there was nothing. An example that I was given was a mosquito bites you on the nose, you feel annoyed and want to squash it, but then you recall that you're a precept-observing Buddhist and so restrain yourself. When this event is described in conventional terms, or according to the Sutta method, it might be said that you had a choice to kill the mosquito or to refrain, and that you chose the latter. But when it is described according to the Abhidhamma method, your abstention from killing was not due to choice but to the arising of kusala cetasikas (wholesome mental factors) such as moral shame and fear of wrong-doing (hiri & ottappa), and abstinence (virati).

Jason

I admit that I still have problems thinking your post through, but it`s good you posted it, it gave me much to think. Nevertheless take the following with caution, I repeat I am an amateur concerning the Abhidhamma.

I think the fault lies in using the subject, such as we and I. If I am not mistaken, the Abhidhamma does not describe phenomena in relation to a subject such as a self. Hence, we neither have controll nor have no controll according to the Abhidhamma. Controll, if there, must be described and understood in unpersonal terms. When translated back to conventional speach, as said, never should deny free will. If not so, I do not see now how fatalism then could be explained away in conventional terms at all, all that was left then is that the fatalism has moral reasons (kamma), therefore, coming dangerously close .to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosala and even closer to the one of Mahavira, the Jain.

Regards

edit:you might be interested in wikipediaarticle on free will. while not deep it gives an outlook also for Buddhism.

[Knight of Buddha]

This idea that we somehow have no control seems to shy away personal responsibility and accountability. I believe that there is choice in all matters, and to think otherwise is to suggest some type of fate (something I am completely unwilling to do)

Personal responsibility, ethics, and actions are what attracted me so greatly towards Buddhism. I sought to move away from fate and destiny as proposed by Western religions and it's faith based dogma. And instead move toward a philosophy or rather way of life revolving around action.

[Bobby_Lanier]

There are all kinds of Pali phrases which indicate self-control which Joaquin Perez-Remon as verified in his book, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. The following are from his book. I have include the page number at the end of each Pali phrase.

"Impell the self by means of the self (attanâ codayattâna.m)..."p., 98

"...control the self by means of the self (pa.tima.msettha attanâ)..."p., 98

"Being with guarded self (attagutto)..."p., 98

"...the wise bring the self under subjection (attâna.m damayanti)..."p., 99

"...mind shoud be exercised by the very self (attarûpena)...."p., 100

"...with mind turned to self (ajjhattacintî)..."p., 100

"Be a doer of what ought to be done for the self (attano kiccakârî'ssa)..."p., 100

"If he were to make his self (attâna.m)..."p., 100

"He is a brahmana who has ousted all evil dispositions, not rough (nihu.mhu.mko), free from impurity, with a self well controlled (yatatto)..."p., 101

"...but I exert my self (attâna.m padahanto)..."p., 103

The theory put forth by the Venerable Dhammanando "that there was nothing" is unconvincing given the above citations that control is clearly being indicated. The mosquito explantion, while certainly ingenious, is nevertheless unconvincing.

Coomaraswamy notes in his book, Metaphysics (page 271), "Attâ the charioteer (j vi.252), and the chariot conversely "enspirited" (attaniya, S v.6), all these are equivalent formulae: the Buddha is the Spirit, and it is only when He holds the reins, only when the Great Self (mahattâ, A 1.249), is in control [emphasis mine], that the contemplative therewith "drives off and away from this world: in what is called the Brahma-vehicle or Dhamma-vehicle (S v.6)."

Rather what is being exercised here is great control, enough to transcend this world and by implication, the five khandhas.


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[not1not2]

I don't see the conflict here, personally. The buddha taught using conventional terminology all of the time as using the terms of 'cetasikas' and such makes for an unnecessarily complex dialogue. We can see the buddha speaking to his audience & tailoring his speech differently to different groups. However, the idea that 'we' have no control is not exactly a foreign discourse to the suttas. He had said in multiple instances how one cannot say 'let my form be thus' and have it be thus. This can be applied to every aspect of identifiable reality. Specifically, volition (cetana) is listed among the khandhas & cannot said to be a fundamental subtance or essence. Nonetheless, to you, me, Bobby, fofoo & practitioners throughout the centuries, this can all be spoken in personal terms. All the abhidhamma approach seems to be doing is breaking these personal phenomena down into their component parts. Arguably this is what is entailed in developing 'knowledge & vision' and dispassion with regard to the world.

Anyway, as none of us are well versed in the subtleties of Abhidhamma, I'm not sure how productive this discussion is going to be.

_/\_
metta

[fofoo]

Even if one accepts the notions of 2 truths, highest versus conventional truth, a sentence having you, we ,I and so on as subject can never be follwed by "have/has no controll at all". We cannot form the khandhas according to our will, but our will is to be controlled. If you cannot observe kamma formations, supress negative and cultivate the good, the whole teaching becomes pointless.

Regards

[Elohim]

fofoo,

The basic idea is that there is no one to control anything. The control that is perceived on the conventional level is itself conditioned, and therefore, there is no control when viewed form the ultimate level since the Abhidhamma refutes any agent that acts.

The Abhidhamma explains that there are simply mental states that arise and cease according to their supporting conditions. In other words, choice in the conventional sense is merely cetanaa cetasika in the ultimate sense as that is its specific function.

Jason

[fofoo]

When a philosophy gets rid of the subject, may it be perceiver, controller, agent - it is not apropriate to speak of no controll of the subject from that persepective. The answer to "do we have controll?" should rather be "does not apply". neither yes nor no.

This way, you do not come in conflict with conventional speach at all. When you translate it back to convention, phrases with a subject, it should not contradict conventional truth of the Buddha. It is not higher truth falsifies conventional truth, rather it is the case it describes things more accurate, as far as I understood.

[Bobby_Lanier]

He had said in multiple instances how one cannot say 'let my form be thus' and have it be thus. This can be applied to every aspect of identifiable reality. Specifically, volition (cetana) is listed among the khandhas & cannot said to be a fundamental subtance or essence.

Not2, is this the passage you had in mind with regard to 'let my form be thus' which is from the Samyutta-Nikaya (S.iii.66)?

"Bhikkhus, form is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not lead to affliction [emphasis mine], and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus."

It seems clear enough to me that if any of the khandhas were actually the attâ or the self, and given that the attâ controls itself, it might be what it wishes. In other words, 'form' would not suffer.

This same idea is expressed in the Mahasaccaka Sutta (#35) of the Majjhima-Nikaya that if the body were the self it might do as it wanted as if to say, "Let my body be thus or not thus." (This would be great—one might never become sick.)

"What thinkest thous then, Aggivessana? In as much as thou has but now said: 'Body is my self,' dost thou possess this power over body—'Let my body be thus, let not my body be so'?"

"That I have not, honoured Gotama."


The real teaching of the Buddha insists that our true self does not consist of componets such as the five khandhas which we take to be our personality (sakkaya). The problem arises for us when we believe that the self is the khandhas or there is no self in which case, when the khandhas disintegrate, so does the self.

In regard to intention or cetana, at A.ii.230-231, the Buddha speaks about the "the deed that is dark with dark result"; "the bright deed with the bright result"; "the deed that is both dark and bright, with a result that is both dark and bright" and the intention (cetana) that is the deed that conduces to the waning of deeds (kammakkhaya).


Love ya'll,

Bobby

[Elohim]

Bobby,

I wonder could the atta or self — if there were such a thing — say, “I wish not to be obscured by the khandhas?”

Jason

[Elohim]

Everyone,

If I may, I would like to see if I could clarify this.

Perhaps the question we are asking could be better put if we start out with the observation that, as far as we know, we exist. Whether this is true in the ultimate sense, and regardless of the fact that such an existence is impermanent and transitory, we have the convention of a person. As far as I concerned, this topic is not about refuting what exists and what does not exist.

As the Suttas have stated (SN 22.22 ( http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.022.than.html)), there is the carrier (puggala) of the burden (upadana-khandha). The person, who in this case is named Jason, is the carrier of the burden. What I think the question we are asking comes down to is whether there is any choice or control that the person (puggala) can exert in the present moment in order to become a Noble One (ariya-puggala).

According to the Abhidhamma, the answer is no.

Furthermore, the reason that the answer is no is twofold. The first reason is that according to the Abhidhamma, there is no agent that acts; therefore, there is no one who can be said to be in control, or that can effectively make decisions. The conventional person (puggala) has no control over the burden (upadana-khandha), even of the aggregate responsible for volition or intention (cetana).

This coincides with reason number two in that such illusions of choice or control are in their ultimate sense conditioned phenomena. The Abhidhamma explains that there are simply mental states that arise and cease according to their supporting conditions, no chooser. In other words, choice in the conventional sense is merely cetanaa cetasika in the ultimate sense as that is its specific function.

The key to this concept is that since there is no agent that acts, there cannot be a specific place where we can point to and say this is responsible for decision-making—decisions are actions conditioned upon arising mental states, which in turn have their supporting conditions, etc. As dead of a horse as anatta might be, the Abhidhamma viewpoint is built entirely upon this one single concept.

Does anybody wish to add their thoughts to this?

Curiously,

Jason

[fofoo]

Jason,

is the Abhidhamma merely saying that the puggala has no control over the burden? Does it accept the notion of being the carrier of the burden at all?

Wether it is the puggala or a mental phenomenon, the problem is merely shifted to another level. You may laugh, but I could ask if a mental phenomena has free will.Or if a mind has free will. Meaning, is everywhere total determination or not?

If all is subject to determination, there is no room for any effort born out of free choice. You must do what you do and cannot do otherwise. Or the mental phenomenas. Or the mind. I want to emphazize that determination does not neccessarily imply predictability.

Can you explain in conventional terms why "no controller/chooser", merely cetanaa cetasikais not fatalism?

Regards

[Elohim]

fofoo,

This is probably way off but, the easiest way for me to understand what is being said is if I look at it as the conventional viewpoint explains things through subject, verb, and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes—i.e. no chooser, only choices being made.

This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once sakkaya-ditthi is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena. Nibbana would then be regarded as the end of this conditional phenomena, or in other words, the cessation of the activity of samsara (perpetual wandering).

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

According to the Abhidhamma, the answer is no.

Furthermore, the reason that the answer is no is twofold. The first reason is that according to the Abhidhamma, there is no agent that acts; therefore, there is no one who can be said to be in control, or that can effectively make decisions. The conventional person (puggala) has no control over the burden (upadana-khandha), even of the aggregate responsible for volition or intention (cetana).

This coincides with reason number two in that such illusions of choice or control are in their ultimate sense conditioned phenomena. The Abhidhamma explains that there are simply mental states that arise and cease according to their supporting conditions, no chooser. In other words, choice in the conventional sense is merely cetanaa cetasika in the ultimate sense as that is its specific function.




Elohim, what is the meaning of reason in the above context? I am not sure I am following you. It seems like you are saying, in this context, a reason is synonymous with a claim. But this is not the meaning of reason which has to do with providing a sufficient basis or ground for an assertion or a belief. In court you would be required to give evidence for your claim. This would be the same as giving reasons.

Here, I find little or no reason. Abhidhamma you say is asserting there is no acting agent because there is no one who is in control. But this is saying the same thing twice as you must be aware. It is like saying, Abhidhamma says there are bachelors in the Sangha who are monks because (i.e., the reason) there are unmarried men present who have taken vows of celibacy!

As for the second reason it is murky at best. Are you saying there is no controller because "such illusion of choice or control are in their ultimate sense conditioned phenomena"? There is a difference between the chooser and the choice; or the controller and the controlled. A controller might be able to control his head, arms, and legs. But just because a controller controls the temporal body we shouldn't draw the hasty conclusion that the controller is also temporal like the body. Logically, it doesn't follow. Are we now to conclude from this that the Buddha, since he used the temporal to explain his enlightenment to those with little dust in their eyes, was also temporal; subject to death (then why did he speak of the deathless realm [amatadhatu]?

Abhidhamma seems to believe that the controller which is engaged with the temporal body (a body which is partite, conditioned and subject to death) must also be conditioned and likewise subject to death.


Love ya'll,

Bobby

[fofoo]

fofoo,

This is probably way off but, the easiest way for me to understand what is being said is if I look at it as the conventional viewpoint explains things through subject, verb, and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes—i.e. no chooser, only choices being made.

This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once sakkaya-ditthi is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena. Nibbana would then be regarded as the end of this conditional phenomena, or in other words, the cessation of the activity of samsara (perpetual wandering).

Jason


This rings true in Schopenhauer´s interpretation of Nibbana and "Pradschna-Paramita", putting aside the equation with his system for a second:

This is precisely the "Pradschna-Paramita" of
the Buddhists, the "Beyond All Knowledge', i.e.,
the point where subject and object no longer
exist. (See I. J. Schmidt, Ueber das Mahayana und
Pratschna-Paramita.)

This might be nitpicking now, but I might ask if we eliminate objects and subjects, are adverbs still allowed? :) see, there is a difference between wanting, free wanting and unfree wanting, for insance

Regards.

[Elohim]

Are we now to conclude from this that the Buddha, since he used the temporal to explain his enlightenment to those with little dust in their eyes, was also temporal; subject to death (then why did he speak of the deathless realm [amatadhatu]?

Abhidhamma seems to believe that the controller which is engaged with the temporal body (a body which is partite, conditioned and subject to death) must also be conditioned and likewise subject to death.

Bobby,

No, because The Abhidhamma does not posit a controller at all. Nevertheless, this is not the anatta thread, and it will not be turned into one. According to the Abhidhamma, there is no self, no controller, no doer, no sufferer, no traveller, et cetera.

As for the deathless state or realm, whatever that might be, where is that deathless state? Does it exist outside of the individual free of greed, hatred, and delusion? If so, how? If it is the unconditioned, how is it that we conditioned beings can realize it?

Jason

[Elohim]

fofoo,

Can you explain in conventional terms why "no controller/chooser", merely cetanaa cetasikais not fatalism?

To return to this question, I thought that I would offer what the Venerable Dhammanando had to say about this (http://www.lioncity.net/buddhism/index.php?showtopic=39696&view=findpost&p=558443):

Causal determinism (hetupaccayavāda) isn't fatalism (niyativāda) and does not do away with what we conventionally take to be freewill and the possibility of choice , even though it treats them as ultimately just useful fictions. But to assert that there is control at the paramattha level — at the level of dhammas — is tantamount to asserting a doctrine of self.


Two non-Buddhist articles of interest in this connection:

Compatibilism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/)

Do the Stoics succeed in showing how people can be morally responsible for some of their actions within the framework of causal determinism? (http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/stoa/seddon1.htm)

From the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, I understand this concept as there being no chooser only the activity or process of choosing. However, when looking at the activities and processes of choosing, can it really be called choice or control without a chooser or controller? I think that the words choice and control are lacking on the conventional level because of the complex process of conditionality that goes into the decision-making process itself. That is how I understand the Venerable Dhammanando's comment about causal determinism, but I could be completely wrong for all I know.

Regards,

Jason

[Iawa]

However, when looking at the activities and processes of choosing, can it really be called choice or control without a chooser or controller? I think that the words choice and control are lacking on the conventional level because of the complex process of conditionality that goes into the decision-making process itself. That is how I understand the Venerable Dhammanando's comment about causal determinism, but I could be completely wrong for all I know.

Regards,

Jason

That's interesting J. Krishnamurti throws those ideas around in his discussions of "choiceless awareness."

[Paladin]

I think, with my limited experience in Buddhism, the Abhidhamma is just that one aspect of practice that trains the person to abandon the belief that the Skandhas are self. Remember that in beginingless time, the Mind is in ignorance and if it knows the corrupted self like the Skandhas are suffering. It would not choose to be entrenched in them, imho. Now let us think logically about the theory of no-controller and such. Why would people practice the Buddhist precepts and believe in Karma if there is 'no-one' to be accountable for (their own actions)?. How about the rebirth theory if there is no-one to be reborn according to their previous deed?

We are all responsible for our own deeds and let us not forget that we can someday become Buddha on the same token if we so choose the right method of practice and right faith.

This is what makes Buddhism a religion of 'mature' minds in that we are all accountable. No fancy god would fly down from the sky to save us. Now if one graduates from learning the Abhidhamma then time to move to higher ground, like studying the Lankavatara and begin that all is the manifestation of Mind itself.

Any Zen folks here, join in!




Paladin

[Iawa]

We are all responsible for our own deeds and let us not forget that we can someday become Buddha on the same token if we so choose the right method of practice and right faith.
Paladin

Is there a doer when all observable phenomenon are merely symptoms of the cosmos.
Apple trees apple, and the earth peoples.

[fofoo]

Is there a doer when all observable phenomenon are merely symptoms of the cosmos.
Apple trees apple, and the earth peoples.

You forget yourself. Introspection is something different than watching apples fall.You can observe volition on yourself, not on the apple, other people or anything else. That`s why meditation is part of the path instead of merely watching apples and trees. :vimp:

[Iawa]

Introspection is a symptom of the cosmos as well, isn't it?

[fofoo]

Cosmology is not my business and it wasn`t the business of the Buddha. While not advocating solipsism, it is hard to generalize results gained from Introspection to the outside.One might very easily be trapped in projecting. I am not enlightend.

Regards

[Simonthepilgrim]

Introspection is a symptom of the cosmos as well, isn't it?

Only if you attribute self-awareness to the cosmos. Another act of faith, I trow.

[Elohim]

Paladin,

I think, with my limited experience in Buddhism, the Abhidhamma is just that one aspect of practice that trains the person to abandon the belief that the Skandhas are self.

The Abhidhamma trains the person to abandon the belief in a self, period.

Remember that in beginingless time, the Mind is in ignorance and if it knows the corrupted self like the Skandhas are suffering. It would not choose to be entrenched in them, imho. Now let us think logically about the theory of no-controller and such. Why would people practice the Buddhist precepts and believe in Karma if there is 'no-one' to be accountable for (their own actions)?. How about the rebirth theory if there is no-one to be reborn according to their previous deed?

That is simple, this/that conditionality (SN 12.20 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.020.than.html)), or as its also known, dependent co-arising (DN 15 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.15.0.than.html)) explains all of this. In addition, in the Pali Nikayas, the mind is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is.

"But as for what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness,' the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it. Why is that? For a long time this has been relished, appropriated, and grasped by the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person as, 'This is me, this is my self, this is what I am.' Thus the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it.

"It would be better for the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person to hold to the body composed of the four great elements, rather than the mind, as the self. Why is that? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or more. But what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. Just as a monkey, swinging through a forest wilderness, grabs a branch. Letting go of it, it grabs another branch. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. In the same way, what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. (SN 12.61 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.061.than.html))

This is what makes Buddhism a religion of 'mature' minds in that we are all accountable. No fancy god would fly down from the sky to save us. Now if one graduates from learning the Abhidhamma then time to move to higher ground, like studying the Lankavatara and begin that all is the manifestation of Mind itself.

From the standpoint of the Abhidhamma itself, there is nothing higher.

Regards,

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

The Abhidhamma trains the person to abandon the belief in a self, period.




Who then makes the decision to abandon the belief in self and then carries out the order?


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[not1not2]

Who then makes the decision to abandon the belief in self and then carries out the order?

Conventionally speaking, you do. In Abhidhamma, this 'you' can be broken down into its constituent parts (ie- cetasikas). Additionally, let's not forget that the very feeling of 'selfness' or 'me-ness' of 'you' is a conditioned phenomena in & of itself.

_/\_
metta

[Elohim]

Bobby,

According to this/that conditionality (idappaccayata), when this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that. Therefore, when the conditions for a self-identification view are no longer present, there will no longer be a self-identification view.

As far as I have seen, within the context of Abhidhamma, the idea of a stable, permanent, or otherwise unconditioned decision-maker, or agent, or self of any kind cannot be found; therefore, from the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, this is a non-issue. The real issues here are the mechanisms of these conditional processes themselves.

Jason

[fofoo]

fofoo,



To return to this question, I thought that I would offer what the Venerable Dhammanando had to say about this (http://www.lioncity.net/buddhism/index.php?showtopic=39696&view=findpost&p=558443):



From the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, I understand this concept as there being no chooser only the activity or process of choosing. However, when looking at the activities and processes of choosing, can it really be called choice or control without a chooser or controller? I think that the words choice and control are lacking on the conventional level because of the complex process of conditionality that goes into the decision-making process itself. That is how I understand the Venerable Dhammanando's comment about causal determinism, but I could be completely wrong for all I know.

Regards,

Jason

Jason,

at least one of the article provided concerning the Stoa makes the case against the Abhidhamma and for an agent. The stoa placed the agent in the role of decision making. thru reason, he ought to realize the consequneces of his acts. He must see that things are conditioned in this and that way, from there the self-responsability comes.

Victory over drives and suffering (stoics saw passion as suffering) is the Agent`s effort thru reason.

Chrysippos of Soli put it this way:

"If someone throws a barrel onto an inclined plane, he gives indeed the outer reason for the beginning of the movement. The intrinsic reason that the barrel rolls downwards however lies in its shape, therefore in its whole nature" (trans. by me from German)

Regards

„

[Elohim]

fofoo,

You would have to take that issue up with the Venerable Dhammanando, as he is the one who provided the article in his post—albeit, on another forum. I simply provided his response in regards to the question of casual determinism versus fatalism.

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

Conventionally speaking, you do. In Abhidhamma, this 'you' can be broken down into its constituent parts (ie- cetasikas). Additionally, let's not forget that the very feeling of 'selfness' or 'me-ness' of 'you' is a conditioned phenomena in & of itself.

_/\_
metta

Not2, Why the don't you provide a citation from the Abhidhamma itself. It would help all of the discussants. I have access to the PTS Abhidhamma over at the theology library, but rather than spend my time with students reeking of bubble gum :) I would prefer the citation from you. By the way, one of the problems I have when you say "you" I don't know if you are referring to citta, sakkaya, puggala, or attâ.


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[Bobby_Lanier]

Bobby,

According to this/that conditionality (idappaccayata), when this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that. Therefore, when the conditions for a self-identification view are no longer present, there will no longer be a self-identification view.

As far as I have seen, within the context of Abhidhamma, the idea of a stable, permanent, or otherwise unconditioned decision-maker, or agent, or self of any kind cannot be found; therefore, from the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, this is a non-issue. The real issues here are the mechanisms of these conditional processes themselves.

Jason


Elohim, Mutatis mutandis, taking the agent as a wave-phenomenon, I can see your point. But my position is that the agent is a wave-maker, who is waveless. Moreover, it is my tentative opinion that Abhidhamma deals almost exclusively with wave-phenomena. It is particularly for those beleaguered souls (satta) who are confused as to the difference between waves and waveless nibbana.

Love ya'll,

Bobby

[not1not2]

Bobby,

Most likely puggala. Sorry, but no citations here.


Elohim, Mutatis mutandis, taking the agent as a wave-phenomenon, I can see your point. But my position is that the agent is a wave-maker, who is waveless. Moreover, it is my tentative opinion that Abhidhamma deals almost exclusively with wave-phenomena. It is particularly for those beleaguered souls (satta) who are confused as to the difference between waves and waveless nibbana.

Love ya'll,

Bobby

Do you have any citations on this waves v. waveless nibbana? They would be helpful. More importantly, are you saying that the Abhidhamma is for confused souls who don't understand the buddhadharma on the level you do? That's what it sounds like. If I recall correctly, didn't you say you weren't qualified to speak as an expert on Buddhism (but as a theologian), back in one of your first posts?

Although I am qualified to speak somewhat as a theologian rather than as a Buddhist expert
http://www.newbuddhist.com/forum/showpost.php?p=24648&postcount=48

thanks,
Confused soul (satta)

_/\_

[not1not2]

Pardon my snarkiness. I've just seen enough veiled slams against theravada.

_/\_
metta

[Elohim]

fofoo,

Can you explain in conventional terms why "no controller/chooser", merely cetanaa cetasikais not fatalism?

On paticca-samuppada, Nyanatiloka Mahathera had this (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nyanatiloka/wheel394.html#ch3) to say:

In hearing that Buddhism teaches that everything is determined by conditions, someone might come to the conclusion that Buddhism teaches some sort of fatalism, or that man has no free will, or that will is not free. Now, with regard to the two questions: (1) "Has man a free will?" and (2) "Is will free?" the Buddhist will say that both these questions are to be rejected for being wrongly put, and therefore unanswerable.

The first question "Has man a free will?" is to be rejected for the reason that, beside these ever-changing mental and physical phenomena, in the absolute sense no such thing or entity can be found that we could call "man," so that "man" as such is merely a name without any reality.

The second question "Is will free?" is to be rejected for the reason that "will" is only a momentary mental phenomenon, just like feeling, consciousness, etc., and thus does not yet exist before it arises, and that therefore of a non-existent thing — of a thing which is not — one could, properly speaking, not ask whether it is free or unfree. The only admissible question would be: "Is the arising of will independent of conditions, or is it conditioned?" But the same question would equally apply also to all the other mental phenomena, as well as to all the physical phenomena, in other words, to everything and every occurrence whatever. And the answer would be: Be it "will," or "feeling," or any other mental or physical phenomenon, the arising of anything whatsoever depends on conditions; and without these conditions, nothing can ever arise or enter into existence.

According to Buddhism, everything mental and physical happens in accordance with laws and conditions; and if it were otherwise, chaos and blind chance would reign. But such a thing is impossible and contradicts all laws of thinking.

Perhaps this will help to shed some new light on this question.

Jason

[Celebrin]

makes sense to me elohim, i agree ..

[fofoo]

fofoo,



On paticca-samuppada, Nyanatiloka Mahathera had this (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nyanatiloka/wheel394.html#ch3) to say:



Perhaps this will help to shed some new light on this question.

Jason

Ah, the brave pioneer Nyanatiloka Mahathera. :) He certainly read Schopenhauer`s fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, but I will not claim that what you quoted was influenced by that. I agree that thinking has laws and is conditioned, and I agree with Schopenhauer that "the iron law of motivation" is the law of inner causality, the conditioning can be described in Buddhist terms of motives for thinking, speaking and acting, harmful and wholesome, there we have akusala-cetanā and kusala-cetanā that are so important to undestand kamma.

I think here lies the source of much confusion. Western Systems often distinguish between causality of external reality and causality in thinking, latter one being basically nothing more than logic. If one wants make sense, one usually has to follow those laws. Will write more when I have come a bit further in my understanding.

Regards

[Vacchagotta]

fofoo,



On paticca-samuppada, Nyanatiloka Mahathera had this (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nyanatiloka/wheel394.html#ch3) to say:



Perhaps this will help to shed some new light on this question.

Jason

It seems to me that in the passage quoted the Ven. Nyanatiloka Mahathera wants to have his cake and eat it too. He says that the questions "Has man a free will" and "Is will free?" are unanswerable because of being wrongly put, but we must remember that he himself has put them this way (I presume in order to set himself up to be able to say they were wrongly put, and to expound on why). More importantly, perhaps, his discussion is an answer to the "unanswerable because wrongly put" questions, though thinly disguised as the reasons the question is ostensibly "unanswerable". The reasons thus given are in fact indistinguishable from the simple answer: "no, will is not free."

[Bobby_Lanier]

Nyanatiloka Mahathera: "In hearing that Buddhism teaches that everything is determined by conditions, someone might come to the conclusion that Buddhism teaches some sort of fatalism, or that man has no free will, or that will is not free."

Given the definition of fatalism (niyata) how is it not a fatalist doctrine (niyativada) to aver that one is constrained or bound (niyata) by conditions (sankhara)? The only possible way I might free myself from such bondage (niyata) is to be potentially independent of sankhara and, therefore, be free of conditions. But then this would not be fatalism insofar as I am able to find a path out of these conditions (sankhara).

I think it is fair to say that the Bhante's grasp of Buddhism is suggestive of a fatalistic position with the belief that all is conditioned. In this respect, it follows that we are automatons who have no means by which to conquer the illusory world into which we have fallen (nidana). Were it otherwise, we would have control—enough to escape (nirvana).


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[not1not2]

I think it is fair to say that the Bhante's grasp of Buddhism is suggestive of a fatalistic position with the belief that all is conditioned. In this respect, it follows that we are automatons who have no means by which to conquer the illusory world into we have fallen (nidana). Were it otherwise, we would have control—enough to escape (nirvana).


Suggestive, yes, but I think that's why he made the statement you quoted:
Nyanatiloka Mahathera: "In hearing that Buddhism teaches that everything is determined by conditions, someone might come to the conclusion that Buddhism teaches some sort of fatalism, or that man has no free will, or that will is not free."

While I can see how his explanation still seems fatalistic, what is being questioned here (in my understanding) is not 'free will', but the idea of an agent that somehow acts from outside of the aggregates. And the effect is that when this 'agency' is rejected, the term 'free will' does not philosophically fit anymore. So, it is in that sense that 'free will' is negated. I don't have any citations here, as I am not versed in Abhidhamma, but that is my understanding of their position.

I do have a few questions for you, though. Do the terms 'volition' & 'will' differ in your understanding? How can 'an agency' influence volition if it is outside it's sphere? Does 'waveless Nibbana' influence the 'waves' in your understanding & how? How does the Abhidhamma explanation clash with the conventional explanation to you (aside from its philsophical/terminological breakdown)?

Metta
_/\_

[fofoo]

I do have a few questions for you, though. Do the terms 'volition' & 'will' differ in your understanding? How can 'an agency' influence volition if it is outside it's sphere? Does 'waveless Nibbana' influence the 'waves' in your understanding & how? How does the Abhidhamma explanation clash with the conventional explanation to you (aside from its philsophical/terminological breakdown)?

Metta
_/\_

For me, volition and will is the same but since I am a native German speaker I might project some notions into the english Will from German "Wille" (whatever they might be)

Esentially it is the idea behind it. without volition, nothing is ugly and nothing is beautiful for instance. Things become so the moment you want or do not want them in my eyes.

Regarding your question of the agent. all explanations I read remain crude. In the west the answer points to logos.Since men has not only volotion but also reason, he can presumably controll it. That`s what behind the quote "man can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants" imo. Volition might come without our controll, but we can realize what kind of volotion it is (wholesome unwholesome) and then either execute or reject it. In that case, we would be agents of volition equipped with reason that can influence volition indirectly.

In Sutta, we have hints that the wise supresses negative volition, stops negative kamma in growing, turning one`s attention away from them and instead focus on the good. Can look up the sutta if you want.

[Simonthepilgrim]

Are we not taught that it is only those born as humans can escape samsara? All the other "realms" are escape-proof because, when we are '#born' into them, we are simply conditioned by our condition (if you see what I mean).

Thus, it must surely follow that there is some aspect of the human condition which permits escape from the conditioned state. Is that what we are talking about when we speak about the will being free?

[Elohim]

Simon,

That is not correct.

Anāgāmī (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/a/anagami.htm)

the 'Non-Returner', is a noble disciple (ariya-puggala) on the 3rd stage of holiness.

There are 5 classes of Non-Returners, as it is said (e.g. Pug. 42-46):

"A being, through the disappearing of the 5 lower fetters (samyojana (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/s_t/samyojana.htm)), reappears in a higher world (amongst the devas of the Pure Abodes, suddhāvāsa (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/s_t/suddhaavaasa.htm)), and without returning from that world (into the sensuous sphere) he there reaches Nibbāna.

(1) "He may, immediately after appearing there (in the Pure Abodes) or without having gone beyond half of the life-time, attain the holy path for the overcoming of the higher fetters. Such a being is called 'one who reaches Nibbāna within the first half of the life' (antarā-parinibbāyī).

(2) "Or, whilst living beyond half of the lifetime, or at the moment of death, he attains the holy path for the overcoming of the higher fetters. Such a being is called 'one who reaches Nibbāna after crossing half the life-time' (upahacca-parinibbāyī).

(3) "Or, with exertion he attains the holy path for the overcoming of the higher fetters. Such a being is called 'one who reaches Nibbāna with exertion' (sasankhāra-parinibbāyī).

(4) "Or, without exertion he attains the holy path for the overcoming of the higher fetters. Such a being is called 'one who reaches Nibbāna without exertion' (asankhāra-parinibbāyī).

(5) "Or, after vanishing from the heaven of the Aviha-gods (http://www.palikanon.com/english/pali_names/ay/avihaa.htm) (s. suddhāvāsa (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/s_t/suddhaavaasa.htm)), he appears in the heaven of the unworried (atappa) gods. After vanishing from there he appears in the heaven of the clearly-visible (sudassa (http://www.palikanon.com/english/pali_names/s/sudassaa.htm)) gods, from there in the heaven of the clear-visioned (sudassī (http://www.palikanon.com/english/pali_names/s/sudassii.htm)) gods, from there in the heaven of the highest (akanittha (http://www.palikanon.com/english/pali_names/am/akanitthaa_devaa.htm)) gods. There he attains the holy path for the overcoming of the higher fetters. Such a being is called 'one who passes up-stream to the highest gods' (uddhamsota-akanittha-gāmī)."

Hence Purelanders.

Jason

[Elohim]

fofoo,

Esentially it is the idea behind it. without volition, nothing is ugly and nothing is beautiful for instance. Things become so the moment you want or do not want them in my eyes.

This topic is complex, as is paticca-samuppada itself.

Conventionally, we might be able to say that we have an indirect influence over volition, but from the standpoint of the Abhidhamma, we cannot say that. We will only see a complex process of conditionality.

Volition might come without our controll, but we can realize what kind of volotion it is (wholesome unwholesome) and then either execute or reject it. In that case, we would be agents of volition equipped with reason that can influence volition indirectly.

All the khandhas are said to be uncontrollable (MN 35 (http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima1/035-culasaccaka-sutta-e1.html)).

Volition or will (cetana) falls under category of mental factors (cetasika), or as volitional actions (kamma), under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha)—both of which are conditioned (sankhata).

In Sutta, we have hints that the wise supresses negative volition, stops negative kamma in growing, turning one`s attention away from them and instead focus on the good. Can look up the sutta if you want.

Everything that is conditioned has it requisite conditions.

Yes, you could find references to monks practicing appropriate attention, but you would also find references that there are conditions leading up to such actions, which consequently, condition further actions.

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

Are we not taught that it is only those born as humans can escape samsara? All the other "realms" are escape-proof because, when we are '#born' into them, we are simply conditioned by our condition (if you see what I mean).

Thus, it must surely follow that there is some aspect of the human condition which permits escape from the conditioned state. Is that what we are talking about when we speak about the will being free?


Escape from the conditioned world, that is, the conjured up world we are thrown into at birth, which surrounds us as the flesh, is no easy matter. The best a non-ariyan might hope for is a nice Vimana! There is a collection of stories in the Pali canon called Vimânavatthu, that is, the Stories of the Mansions. They prove that merit-making pays off in the next birth in which the departed being (satta) receives a huge mansion (vimana)—which to this gaffer sounds like the equivalent of a celestial Southern mansion sans slaves.

To receive such a mansion, however, we need merit. Merit-making could be accomplished by almost anything living, if they listen to the Dhamma being preached with an open heart. One such story that comes to mind is that of a frog. Yep, you heard it right, a frog. I will briefly describe the good fortune of this little hopper which is found in the Mandukadevaputtavimana (V. The Fifth Division: Great Chariot, 1 (51). The first: Frog-Deva Mansion).

One day the Lord was with some great compassion. However, he knew that on that day, by the evening, when he was teaching Dhamma, a frog hearing his voice and being attracted to it, would be killed, "suffering violence at someone's hand". Yet, because of his merit, the frog would be reborn in a deva-world (it seems a cowherd leaning on his crook, listening to the Lord, crushed the poor little fellow).

At any rate, after being crushed to death the frog got a beautiful mansion and was attended by nymphs.

So there is some hope even for those who are not yet ariyans. If we listen to the Lord's Dhamma with an open heart like the little frog we too will attain "the unmoving place" and will "grieve not".

Love ya'll,


Bobby

[Iawa]

Only if you attribute self-awareness to the cosmos. Another act of faith, I trow.


"Violence ends when awareness sees awareness, rather than other."

[Simonthepilgrim]

Simon,

That is not correct.



Hence Purelanders.

Jason

Please explain, Jason, to this slow person: the quoted text refers to "he", over and again. To my eye it suggests that this "he" has to "attain". Are you saying that this text, which seems to say it nowhere in your extract, sets out some sort of conditioned determinism? What does this do (and I know this is an old question) to personal responsibility?

[not1not2]

Simon,

One of the names/titles attributed to the buddha is 'teacher of Gods & Humans'. There are many suttas/sutras where the buddha is doing just this. So I would guess that a human rebirth is not absolutely necessary for Awakening. However, I think what you may have been referring to the teaching that a human rebirth is fortunate because there is not too much pleasure & not too much pain. In both cases, the sensations overwhelm the individual & heedlessness ensues.

In the case of Devas, their experience is so rapturous (and they are so entangled in that sensation) that the fail to create the conditions for future Devahood & will often fall into a hell realm once their good karma expires. For hell beings, they are so consumed by suffering that they cannot even recognize this.

So, human rebirth is an excellent position for awakening as one can still effectively see the positive/negative results of good/bad actions without being too overwhelmed. However, as I said, there are Bodhisattvas & Devas who are capable of learning the Path.

Hope this answers your question. Back to the topic.

metta
_/\_

[Simonthepilgrim]

Simon,

One of the names/titles attributed to the buddha is 'teacher of Gods & Humans'. There are many suttas/sutras where the buddha is doing just this. So I would guess that a human rebirth is not absolutely necessary for Awakening. However, I think what you may have been referring to the teaching that a human rebirth is fortunate because there is not too much pleasure & not too much pain. In both cases, the sensations overwhelm the individual & heedlessness ensues.

In the case of Devas, their experience is so rapturous (and they are so entangled in that sensation) that the fail to create the conditions for future Devahood & will often fall into a hell realm once their good karma expires. For hell beings, they are so consumed by suffering that they cannot even recognize this.

So, human rebirth is an excellent position for awakening as one can still effectively see the positive/negative results of good/bad actions without being too overwhelmed. However, as I said, there are Bodhisattvas & Devas who are capable of learning the Path.

Hope this answers your question. Back to the topic.

metta
_/\_

This is not what I have been taught. Human birth, my teachers told me, was not just "an excellent position for awakening" but the only birth that gives access to enlightenment, quite simply because it is the only birth which permits choice. Not having met any "devas" in my travels, I cannot speak to their existence or to their ability to awaken.

[Elohim]

Simon,

This is not what I have been taught. Human birth, my teachers told me, was not just "an excellent position for awakening" but the only birth that gives access to enlightenment, quite simply because it is the only birth which permits choice. Not having met any "devas" in my travels, I cannot speak to their existence or to their ability to awaken.

Well, you would have to take that issue up with your teacher. All that I can offer you is that the Buddha did teach about other realms of existence, and that according to the Pali Canon, it is possible to attain the cessation of suffering within them—if the prerequisite conditions are present. The example that I provided was concerning non-returners, which attain release after being reborn in one of the heavenly realms. This, however, is only possible if they have previously abandoned the first five fetters.

Jason

[Elohim]

Please explain, Jason, to this slow person: the quoted text refers to "he", over and again. To my eye it suggests that this "he" has to "attain". Are you saying that this text, which seems to say it nowhere in your extract, sets out some sort of conditioned determinism? What does this do (and I know this is an old question) to personal responsibility?

Simon,

The complexities of conditionality...

In the beginning, "you" are responsible. As there is avijja (ignorance) present, there is also conditioned upon that a deluded view of reality, and of course, of a self, soul, agent, et cetera. With this sakkaya-ditthi (self-identification view), the only logical start is "I am the owner of my action, the heir of my actions." That is why the Buddha teaches this very formula as a subject for frequent contemplation (AN 5.57 ( http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an05/an05.057.than.html)).

A person must first see that their actions do have effects—effects that may take them further along the Path, or effects which take them further away from the Path. However, after avijja has successfully been removed through the conditions of study and practice, there will no longer be any sense of self added to this equation. No "person" will be found as the mastermind behind all it all, but it will clearly be seen that it was ignorance that actually made this conditional process possible—it being the master link in the chain of paticca-samuppada (dependent co-arising).

The real problem is, if you start by telling people that "nobody" is actually responsible, the conditions might be present for them to think that as meaning they can do whatever they want consequence free—a doctrine of Purana-Kassapa, which was refuted by the Buddha. That would be a very stupid thing to do, in my opinion, because with ignorance still present, each intentional action produces more conditions for further becoming.

The Buddha has us begin with seeing ourselves as responsible for our actions. There are intentions behind them, and skillful intentions lead to skillful results (i.e. wisdom), while unskillful intentions lead to unskillful results (i.e. delusion). The trick is to understand that even though we are conditioned, we can utilize that conditionality to point us to that which is unconditioned. The Buddha does not have us confirm or deny a self — that is merely a form of self-view one way or the other — but he instead has us travel towards a direct realization of anatta itself.

As I see this, from my unenlightened POV, a conditional mind cannot grasp anatta simply as a concept, and therefore it can seem to make no sense logically, but it is still an integral part of the Path. Once anatta is clearly seen, however, all such questions dealing with "who" and "what" no longer apply. Moreover, as soon as the goal of release has been realized, there is nothing more to do, and "nobody" not to do it.

Hence the conventional vs. ultimate.

Jason

[fofoo]

All the khandhas are said to be uncontrollable (MN 35).

Volition or will (cetana) falls under category of mental factors (cetasika), or as volitional actions (kamma), under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha)—both of which are conditioned (sankhata).

So, what does a haircutter do when I visit him. Or what do I do when I cut my nails. Or move my arm. Are you sure uncontrollable is the right rendering? Or would conditioned be more apropriate?

[fofoo]

fofoo,



This topic is complex, as is paticca-samuppada itself.

Volition or will (cetana) falls under category of mental factors (cetasika), or as volitional actions (kamma), under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha)—both of which are conditioned (sankhata).



Everything that is conditioned has it requisite conditions.

Jason

conditons for kamma-formations, sankhāra, is ignorance or not knowing (avijja). What if I removed avijja to the extend I can see sankhara rise and cease? What if i can see if they merely are rooted in delusion or addiontanlly in hatred and greed? Is it still justified to tell me then I have no controll over them?

Regards

[fofoo]

If we take the 50 cetasika of the sankhāra khandha listing in the Abhidhamma for granted, skip any subject possessing them and assuming for a moment that these are the properties of every mind, like the procedures of a computer program:

What causes them? I presume I am born with certain constelations due to my kamma I brought with me from my previous existence. But does my previous existence matter at all? What I want to say is that the current state matters, and there must be something to improve it or to worsen it. Ironically, ignorance then must be the cause (some form of sakyha dhitti) for me to pursue some practice, because I belief it benifits me and if I would come the conclusion of the Abhidhamma, was the supporting condition for coming there, although i might figure out I was wrong with my assumption. Only then we can explain away fatalism, if you want to explain no no controller hence no controll to people with sakyha-dhitti, it will make no sense imo. Stating no controll to anybody using conventional terms, speaking in subjects and objects must fail. Incidentally, Ignorance is also the condition for wholesome kamma-formations in paticca-samuppada

[Bobby_Lanier]

In the very first verse of the Dhammapada we learn that if a man speaks (bhâsati) or acts (karoti = the verb KAR, to do, to act, to perform) with an evil thought, dukkha follows him like the wheel the foot of the ox. Then in the next verse we also learn that if a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows him as a consequence. It almost goes without saying, there is a choice between going with an evil corrupt thought and a thought which is pure. And indeed there is because mind (mano) is the foremost (setthâ) and the artificer (mayâ).

The Buddha has said that phenomena (dhammâ) are mind-preceded (manopubbangamâ). Such phenomena are always changing as mind creates (maya) anew. In fact, we may say that as mind creates (manomaya) phenomena arises which can be either corrupt or pure. If corrupt, we speak and act corruptly. If good, we speak and act for the good.

Show me what a person mentally creates (manomaya) and I will tell you whether they are evil or good. If a person's mind is hate-filled; beset with fancies and foolish desires; that person will speak and act in evil ways. It is not as if these thoughts just happened to show up in that person's brain all of a sudden. They were made by him and acted upon. This person had the option to create beautiful thoughts; to think kindly of others; to do what is right and noble, and to build a legacy of good merit.

Indeed, there is a controller or if you prefer, a moral agent. There are evil and good thoughts that can be made. There is blame, too. There is the burden of guilt and a bad conscience for having created evil thoughts then speaking and acting on their behalf.

I remember when Jean-Paul Sartre took on his countrymen for their loathsome conduct during WWII. He despised the fact that many of his countrymen disclaimed responsibility for their cowardly and hypocritical roles during that war (and we Americans are no better for our cowardly response to this present war). One can only collaborate with evil because their thoughts sympathize with evil by making excuses for allowing evil to take root. For example, we are familiar with such excuses as, "I have to take care of my family first" or "I couldn't help it; I had no choice."

Like the Dhammapada suggests, we all get what we deserve. But this thought or belief that we are hopelessly conditioned and impotent is, itself, the result of mind's artifice (manomaya). We have also made a choice to attach to a world which is dependently originated (Skt., pratityasamutpada) wanting to take an endless ride on the wheel of samsara.


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[Elohim]

Bobby,

Those two lines from the Dhammapada illustrate the basic framework of conditionality themselves. The quality of an act is conditioned by the state of mind of the individual, and as you point out, the type of person (good, evil, et cetera) is conditioned upon the type of actions they perform. Moreover, mind as we have already covered, is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is (SN 12.61 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.061.than.html)). It's really not all that hard to understand.

Jason

[Elohim]

So, what does a haircutter do when I visit him. Or what do I do when I cut my nails. Or move my arm. Are you sure uncontrollable is the right rendering? Or would conditioned be more apropriate?

fofoo,

There are countless conditions that go into any given moment. When a barber cuts your hair, there is a complex matrix of causes and conditions for them to do so. Maybe you are just confusing ultimate for conventional.

The aggregates are said to be uncontrollable in the sense of, "But precisely because form (feeling, perception, fabrications, consciousness) is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let my form be thus. Let my form not be thus" (SN 22.59 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.059.than.html)).

The Buddha taught that volitional actions (kamma) fall under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha), which are conditioned (sankhata). This is quite standard in the Pali Canon. What more can I say?

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

Bobby,

Those two lines from the Dhammapada illustrate the basic framework of conditionality themselves. The quality of an act is conditioned by the state of mind of the individual, and as you point out, the type of person (good, evil, et cetera) is conditioned upon the type of actions they perform. Moreover, mind as we have already covered, is as fleeting and impermanent as anything else is (SN 12.61 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.061.than.html)). It's really not all that hard to understand.

Jason


The most basic framework is mind's capacity for artifice (maya). We may all testify to this by introspection. 'Conditionality' is merely a description of the agential process which is self-conditioning and self-liberating.

The 'conditionality explanation' may satisfy those who are trying to scrub the Buddhist canon of any notion of self as, for example, in "having an emancipated self" (vimutt-attâ), by trying to appear consistent with the theory of no self. But this maneuver doesn't work—those who are having difficulty with understanding the place of self and attakara (self-doing) in the canon seem to be substituting the problem with the reification of an abstraction, viz., conditionality. Conditionality is supposed to do all the stuff an agent would normally do only now one can say, "Nope, there ain't any agential notion in Buddhism—conditions do it." This falls rather flat when we encounter passages like this:

"It is by the self that evil is done, it is by the self that one is impure,
It is by the self that one avoids evil, it is by the self (attanâ) that one is purified,
Purity and impurity depend on the self (paccattam), no one could purify another" (Dhammapada 165).

And a word about the last topic, if mind is so fleeting, why is it said to achieve liberation? Why then does the Buddha speak about mind being liberated (cittam vimuttam) from lust (raga), liberated from hatred, liberated from delusion (i.e., the three poisons)? Surely, in this context mind is more than a fleeting every day thought?


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[fofoo]

fofoo,

There are countless conditions that go into any given moment. When a barber cuts your hair, there is a complex matrix of causes and conditions for them to do so. Maybe you are just confusing ultimate for conventional.

The aggregates are said to be uncontrollable in the sense of, "But precisely because form (feeling, perception, fabrications, consciousness) is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let my form be thus. Let my form not be thus" (SN 22.59 (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.059.than.html)).

The Buddha taught that volitional actions (kamma) fall under the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakhandha), which are conditioned (sankhata). This is quite standard in the Pali Canon. What more can I say?

Jason

I know Jason, I argued the khandhas lack full controll myself in the Anatta Thread:)

I have problems with the term uncontrollable. We are said to verif the teachings by ourself. I, conventionally speaking, have of course controll over the kandhas allbeit limited. I can shape my body to some extend, i can suppress thought, cut my hair. On the long run however, they will do what they want without asking me. Hair will fall, body decay and so on. Without wanting to introduce more complex thoughts, my current understanding that kandhas lack full controll and at the long run willgo the way they are , e.g. genetically, conditioned. I think time might be important here, temporary controll vs ultimiate controll. just my thoughts.

Regards

[Elohim]

Bobby,

'Conditionality' is merely a description of the agential process which is self-conditioning and self-liberating.

Except that the Buddha never said this.

This falls rather flat when we encounter passages like this:

A poor translation doesn't persuade me.

And a word about the last topic, if mind is so fleeting, why is it said to achieve liberation?


Are you arguing with me or the Buddha?

"No other thing do I know, O monks, that changes so quickly as the mind. It is not easy to give a simile for how quicky the mind changes. (AN I.v.8)

"But as for what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness,' the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it. Why is that? For a long time this has been relished, appropriated, and grasped by the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person as, 'This is me, this is my self, this is what I am.' Thus the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it.

"It would be better for the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person to hold to the body composed of the four great elements, rather than the mind, as the self. Why is that? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or more. But what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. Just as a monkey, swinging through a forest wilderness, grabs a branch. Letting go of it, it grabs another branch. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. In the same way, what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. (SN 12.61)

Jason

[fofoo]

In the very first verse of the Dhammapada we learn that if a man speaks (bhâsati) or acts (karoti = the verb KAR, to do, to act, to perform) with an evil thought, dukkha follows him like the wheel the foot of the ox. Then in the next verse we also learn that if a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows him as a consequence. It almost goes without saying, there is a choice between going with an evil corrupt thought and a thought which is pure. And indeed there is because mind (mano) is the foremost (setthâ) and the artificer (mayâ).

The Buddha has said that phenomena (dhammâ) are mind-preceded (manopubbangamâ). Such phenomena are always changing as mind creates (maya) anew. In fact, we may say that as mind creates (manomaya) phenomena arises which can be either corrupt or pure. If corrupt, we speak and act corruptly. If good, we speak and act for the good.

Show me what a person mentally creates (manomaya) and I will tell you whether they are evil or good. If a person's mind is hate-filled; beset with fancies and foolish desires; that person will speak and act in evil ways. It is not as if these thoughts just happened to show up in that person's brain all of a sudden. They were made by him and acted upon. This person had the option to create beautiful thoughts; to think kindly of others; to do what is right and noble, and to build a legacy of good merit.

Indeed, there is a controller or if you prefer, a moral agent. There are evil and good thoughts that can be made. There is blame, too. There is the burden of guilt and a bad conscience for having created evil thoughts then speaking and acting on their behalf.

I remember when Jean-Paul Sartre took on his countrymen for their loathsome conduct during WWII. He despised the fact that many of his countrymen disclaimed responsibility for their cowardly and hypocritical roles during that war (and we Americans are no better for our cowardly response to this present war). One can only collaborate with evil because their thoughts sympathize with evil by making excuses for allowing evil to take root. For example, we are familiar with such excuses as, "I have to take care of my family first" or "I couldn't help it; I had no choice."

Like the Dhammapada suggests, we all get what we deserve. But this thought or belief that we are hopelessly conditioned and impotent is, itself, the result of mind's artifice (manomaya). We have also made a choice to attach to a world which is dependently originated (Skt., pratityasamutpada) wanting to take an endless ride on the wheel of samsara.


Love ya'll,


Bobby


All,

where does the debate leave us with the question if a controller is needed for controll? How do you all interpret the following:

"Mano-pubbangama dhamma, mano-settha, mano-maya."

Mind is chief, controller, agent, whateer name you give it here. I dare to say that the Dhammapada proclaims an agent, abeit not atman but namely mind, in contrast to the what we heard about the Abhidhamma.

[Elohim]

fofoo,

Mind is chief, controller, agent, whateer name you give it here. I dare to say that the Dhammapada proclaims an agent, abeit not atman but namely mind, in contrast to the what we heard about the Abhidhamma.

Mind conditions, but mind is also conditioned. As the Buddha said, the mind is even more fleeting than the body. If you say that "mind" is this agent, which mind? The Buddha himself said that the mind changes so quickly that it is not easy to give a simile for how quickly it changes—that by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. None of this contradicts what is said in the Abhidhamma.

Jason

[fofoo]

Jason, the quote you gave from (AN I.v.8) is a point of serious controversy. It cannot be meant that all characteristics of it change quickly, elsewise it cannot be cultivated, as it is stated in AN I.iv:

31. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as a not tamed mind. A not tamed mind is harmful. This is the first.

32. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is harmless, as a tamed mind. A tamed mind is harmless. This is the second.

33. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as an uncontrolled mind. An uncontrolled mind is harmful. This is the third.

34. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless, as a controlled mind. A controlled mind is harmless. This is the fourth.

35. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as an unprotected mind. An unprotected mind is harmful This is the fifth.

36. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless, as a protected mind. A protected mind is harmless. This is the sixth.

37. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so hàrmful as an unrestrained mind. An unrestrained mind is harmful. This is the seventh.

38. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless, as a restrained mind. A restrained mind

is harmless. This is the eighth.

39. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmful as a not tamed, not controlled, not protected and not restrained mind. A not tamed, not controlled, not protected and not restrained mind is harmful.

40. Bhikkhus, I do not know of a thing that is so harmless as a tamed, controlled, protected and restrained mind. A tamed, controlled, protected and restrained mind is harmless.

I would be glad if we could explore (AN I.v.8) in more detail. We had it,I think already, Nyanatolika translates citta here as "conciousness" My commentary says that:

(*1) K: nach schnellem Entstehen ein schnelles Vergehen. K bemerkt ferner, dass dieser Text am Schluss einer Lehrunterweisung gesprochen wurde (die uns offenbar nicht erhalten ist). -
Bewusstsein = citta, welches aus stilistischen Gründen vorher mit Geist wiedergegeben wurde.

[I] After fast originating comes a fast cessation. K remarks further that this text was spoken at the end of an instructive speech (which itself obviously is not any moreavailble to us)
conciousness = citta, which was rendered previously as mind/spirit previously.

Emphazis through bolds by me. We have to handle that part of this sutta (AN I.v.8) with extreme caution,since it lacks the context.

Regards

[Elohim]

fofoo,

On the conventional level, you can say that all mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made—if one speaks or acts with an evil mind, suffering (dukkha) follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart, or if one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him.

On the ultimate level, however, what is "mind"? Is mind a permanent, stable, and unconditioned phenomenon that acts, but is not acted upon by conditionality? The answer, whether from the Suttas or the Abhidhamma, is no. Mind is indeed an impermanent, unstable, and conditioned phenomenon. The arising of mind has its own requisite conditions, just as its ceasing has its own requisite conditions.

Jason

[Elohim]

fofoo,

I would be glad if we could explore (AN I.v.8) in more detail. We had it,I think already, Nyanatolika translates citta here as "conciousness" My commentary says that:

(*1) K: nach schnellem Entstehen ein schnelles Vergehen. K bemerkt ferner, dass dieser Text am Schluss einer Lehrunterweisung gesprochen wurde (die uns offenbar nicht erhalten ist). -
Bewusstsein = citta, welches aus stilistischen Gründen vorher mit Geist wiedergegeben wurde.

[I] After fast originating comes a fast cessation. K remarks further that this text was spoken at the end of an instructive speech (which itself obviously is not any moreavailble to us)
conciousness = citta, which was rendered previously as mind/spirit previously.

Well, at least from the general Theravadin standpoint (which I am sure will be contended), citta (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/b_f/citta.htm) (mind, consciousness, state of consciousness) is synonymous with mano (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/g_m/mano.htm) (mind) and vinnana (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/u_v/vinnaana.htm) (consciousness).

Jason

[fofoo]

fofoo,



Well, at least from the general Theravadin standpoint (which I am sure will be contended), citta (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/b_f/citta.htm) (mind, consciousness, state of consciousness) is synonymous with mano (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/g_m/mano.htm) (mind) and vinnana (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/u_v/vinnaana.htm) (consciousness).

Jason

It would be interesting to find out if they are similar or redundant. If the former is the case, this could be a worthwhile issue to pursue to understand mind and conciousness better. If they are redundant, I honestly must say I am confused.

Regarding to you question of the mind. I undeterstand that the syntetic activites called mind made can at least theoretically be analyzed into groups.

when we go to ultimate level and look at Consciousness-States (viññāna kkhandha) (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/table1.htm) and Mental-States (sankhāra kkhandha) (http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/table2.htm), there we have it.

Now, if we look at table I, Impulsion (javana) can be associated with right or wrong view, for instance. The impuls must come from somewhere.

I think the problem of the debate is similar of that finding a first cause. One asks why and ends up seeing a conditioned chain. If one cuts of that chain, simply looking at the current state, the problem becomes rather theoretical, belongs to the realm of theorizers.

Regards

[Elohim]

fofoo,

It would be interesting to find out if they are similar or redundant. If the former is the case, this could be worthwhile to pursue to unserstand mind and conciousness better. If they are redundant, I honestly must say I am confused.

As it were, there is an interesting discussion of this here (http://www.forum.websangha.org/viewtopic.php?t=538).

Jason

[Bobby_Lanier]

fofoo, Moggallana seems to have some great spirit powers. Bhikkhus Bodhi translates at S.i.195:

Moggallana, great in spiritual power,
Encompassed their mind with his own,
And searching [he came to see] their minds:
Fully released (vippamutta), without acquisitions (nirupadhi)!

I would first argue that Moggallana's mind was powerful rather than passive. It's not the fickle mind of the typical worlding.

But getting back to the control issue, in the PTS Dic. reading about the various definitions of citta, I came across this:

"from the fetters of Mara those are released who control their heart" Dh 37. The word used here for control is "saṃyamissanti" (the verb YAM meaning to "restrain"); while heart is the familiar "citta". So back to the controller of the fickled mind or the mind released.


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[Bobby_Lanier]

I was reading the Anguttara-Nikaya drinking some ginger-bread flavored coffee (decaf) and came across these passages of interest. Here is the citation for both: A.iii.387 VI, VI, § 58 (PTS). (Well, it is Celtic tree month and I have to celebrate!)

Herein, monks, the cankers to be got rid of by control by a monk are go rid of by control; to be rid of by use, endurance, avoidance, ejection, growth, are got rid of by [these qualities respectively].

Monks, consider the monk who with conscious purpose lives controlled by controlling the eye-faculties. Whereas, were he to live uncontrolled, the cankers, vexations, tormenting, would arise; since he lives controlled by controlling the eye faculties, the cankers are not. So, too, as to the faculties of the ear, nose tongue, body, mind. ... Whereas where he to live uncontrolled in control, the cankers, vexations, tormenting, would arise; since he lives controlled in control, the cankers are not.

I think earlier fofoo was thinking along the same lines. I don't think it will throw water on this fire, but who knows.

As we all must admit by know, we spend a lot of time going over Suttas, and that is a good thing. This is why I celebrate these discussions—they offer to fellow discussants a learing experience. In the Phagguna Sutta of the Anguttara-Nikaya the Buddha said that without the Tathagata or a disciple present if one "ever reflects in mind on Dhamma, as heard, as learnt, ponders on it, pores over it...his mind is wholly freed as to the complete destruction of the root of becoming" (A.iii.382, VI, VI, § 57).

Love ya'll,


Bobby

[Iawa]

Please explain, Jason, to this slow person: the quoted text refers to "he", over and again. To my eye it suggests that this "he" has to "attain". Are you saying that this text, which seems to say it nowhere in your extract, sets out some sort of conditioned determinism? What does this do (and I know this is an old question) to personal responsibility?

I have a problem with the concept personal responsiblity, because it's one of those qualities that if beyond the scope of the observers consciousness does not exist. Sad

[fofoo]

I have a problem with the concept personal responsiblity, because it's one of those qualities that if beyond the scope of the observers consciousness does not exist. Sad

It`s a bit of a dilemma. Without personal responsibility, there is not need of forgivness. Without forgivness, one might become brutal. I believe this always has been a problem of human relationship. Metaphors like "looking into one`s heart" have always been important means to communicate understanding and compassion for others beyond mere logical battles of free will vs total determination. Sorry for going off-topic a bit :)

[Iawa]

You're always welcome!

[fofoo]

fofoo, Moggallana seems to have some great spirit powers. Bhikkhus Bodhi translates at S.i.195:



I would first argue that Moggallana's mind was powerful rather than passive. It's not the fickle mind of the typical worlding.

But getting back to the control issue, in the PTS Dic. reading about the various definitions of citta, I came across this:

"from the fetters of Mara those are released who control their heart" Dh 37. The word used here for control is "saṃyamissanti" (the verb YAM meaning to "restrain"); while heart is the familiar "citta". So back to the controller of the fickled mind or the mind released.


Love ya'll,


Bobby

Bobby, from my personal limited studies on both western religon/philosophy and Buddhism, heart mostly points to volition. He died of a broken heart translates he lost the will to live. He has a heart of stone translates he ruthlessly goes after what he wants without regarding the wishes of others. His heart is bleeding translates to he loves something that is not any more available or does not give back love. I do not want to completely rationalize beautiful metaphors here, it is just my reading.:)


Reading a bit about Moggallana, (http://ignca.nic.in/jatak090.htm) his end seems to have been quite cruel. From my reading, he was equipped with supranatural powers, as he could change even his form. How litereal one might take the Jataka Story about him, he defenetly was an interesting fellow :) He seemed to have been creative, rather than passive, I agree, what`s noteworthy however is his end, as his powers could not prevent him to earn the fruits of his kamma from previous life. Linking it back to the topic here, I rather see Moggallana`s fate as a case for determination, namley by kammic law. However,it also indicates that since he was an arhant, Mara could not influence him any more, despite of its cruel appearance in form of thugs who beat him to death.

Regards

[Simonthepilgrim]

Bobby, from my personal limited studies on both western religon/philosophy and Buddhism, heart mostly points to volition. He died of a broken heart translates he lost the will to live. He has a heart of stone translates he ruthlessly goes after what he wants without regarding the wishes of others. His heart is bleeding translates to he loves something that is not any more available or does not give back love. I do not want to completely rationalize beautiful metaphors here, it is just my reading.:)


............................ (http://ignca.nic.in/jatak090.htm)


Your fondness for the philosophers of Will need not blind you to the fact that there are other possible deconstructions. Indeed, there are many of us who believe that Will is not the only driver.

[fofoo]

I do not dispute that. That`s why I said it is my reading.

[zenmonk_genryu]

Responsibility. Interestingly (or not), at the monastery I'm in at the moment, a teacher was talking yesterday about responsibility being simply the ability to respond appropriately in any given moment. It's not down to will I would say.

[federica]

Responsibility. Interestingly (or not), at the monastery I'm in at the moment, a teacher was talking yesterday about responsibility being simply the ability to respond appropriately in any given moment. It's not down to will I would say.

Only insofar as you may choose to "respond appropriately" - or inappropriately - in one way or another. Responsibility is not judgemental. Will is.

[Bobby_Lanier]

fofoo, These are my German buddies. :)

"The source of self-consciousness is will ( 1797)...There is finally and preëminently no other Being but will. The will is primary Being and to it alone are applicable all its predicates: groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-assertion ( 1809)." — Schelling

"That in general anything comes to pass, that the effect follows, depends on the Will; that the effect, if it follows, follows with necessity as this and no other, depends on the Logical. . . . That things be, is determined by the alogical Will; what things are, is determined by the logical Idea." — Eduard v. Hartmann

The above follows very much the Mind-only school of Buddhism; that determinate reality is supported by Mind or Wille, which Kant described a the formative principle.

Turning to Schopenhauer, Buddhism differs from his philosophy in this regard: the will does not need to be subjugated; but when it comprehends itself (svacittdristamatra) the fiery thirst of desire ends. For all along desire was just the incompleteness (avidya) of the will with itself. This lack or want of itself spurred it on to create all things (sarvadharma).

From the side of the practitioner both classical Ch'an (J., Zen) and Tibetan Dzogchen teach the apperception of the pure will which is usually translated as 'Mind'. Dzogchen is remarkable in that the adept sees things as harmless natural will-formations. It is not an intellectual apperception either. It is perfected power (siddha). He generates a field of energy about him which may explain why Buddhist art employs the halo. He transmits this power to the disciple who then prefects it by a life time of practice.

Much of this is not taught Westerners because it is too difficult to deal with their monophasic cultural upbrining (Asian cultures are polyphasic). So they essentially get the short shrift. Lamas are quite content to lest Western scholars translate the esoteric stuff. They can't employ it anyway.

With regard to will in Judaism and Christianity it all begins with Genesis and how we might read it.

Beraeshith bara Aelohim aeth-ha-shamaim w'aeth-ha-âretz.

You could read it as follows: It [Wille] created Aelohim (being of beings); the implicate of heaven and earth. In this pericope we see that Wille pluralizes itself becoming (Aelohim), thus becoming many; which is undeveloped. In my opinion, and that doesn't count much, the Old Testament is really an elaborate meditation on mind and body; working back to the realization of the unconditioned. I think to some extent the Torah Jews understand this.


Love ya'll,


Bobby

[fofoo]

Responsibility. Interestingly (or not), at the monastery I'm in at the moment, a teacher was talking yesterday about responsibility being simply the ability to respond appropriately in any given moment. It's not down to will I would say.

It`s certainly a nice way to put it without getting involved in long lasting disputes (I recall having read often that the issue was transfered from the realm of "dry" philosophers to the domain of neuro-scientists).



Only insofar as you may choose to "respond appropriately" - or inappropriately - in one way or another. Responsibility is not judgemental. Will is.

Generally, I am not opposed to judging, very least regarding myself, as long as the emphazis is not on blame but compassion and improving.

Regularily looking if one is tormented by the three poisons i consider to be an important element of the path, and even if free will is postulated, I propose that everyone should keep in mind that choice is limited by people`s skills, and emphazis should be on stressing the potential of becoming better, not lamenting on what went wrong.

Regards

[Iawa]

Your fondness for the philosophers of Will need not blind you to the fact that there are other possible deconstructions. Indeed, there are many of us who believe that Will is not the only driver.

Simon,
you hit the nail on the head we are all deconstructions/reconstructionists from the the path of light, to the path of vibrations traveling the ear which we percieve in an auditory manner.

Seems there's losts of variables to confuse that complex onboard plasma mircoprocessor into a state of delusion, eh, not to mention that damn looping recording/reinforcing/rejecting mechanistic feature that is all to difficult to reprogram, let alone bypass.;)

In Gassho

[fofoo]

In essence, what they were saying was that there is no khandha under our control (MN 35); therefore, there is no control. In addition, since this takes into account past kamma as well as present kamma, both being conditioned and further conditioning the present moment, it is not guilty of the Jain's wrong view of kamma.

Jason

Jason,

Firstly, I still have problems seeing above view not guilty as falling under the Jain's view of Karma. I do not want to go on your nerves with my German translations, but the rendering in my suttas is pre-determined (vorhergewirkt), rather than " result of past". While similar terms, the subtle difference comes when arguing that the Jains point that was refuted merely was that all is fully conditioned by past, arguing that presence also fully condiondend might not help against the case of pre-determination. Maybe we can look at the Pali terms in near future.

Secondly, I still have problems not seeing the no-controll claim as not falling under the view of Gosala. I provide following from DN2:

"When this was said, Makkhali Gosala said to me, 'Great king, there is no cause, no requisite condition, for the defilement of beings. Beings are defiled without cause, without requisite condition. There is no cause, no requisite condition, for the purification of beings. Beings are purified without cause, without requisite condition. There is nothing self-caused, nothing other-caused, nothing human-caused. There is no strength, no effort, no human energy, no human endeavor. All living beings, all life, all beings, all souls are powerless, devoid of strength, devoid of effort. Subject to the changes of fate, serendipity, and nature, they are sensitive to pleasure and pain in the six great classes of birth. "

While one can probably refute most points of Gosalla by still holding to a concept of moral retribution, can one say if there is no controll, there still is a requisite condition for purification? Strictly speaking, if everything is conditioned, all conditions are requisite, because they cannot be other than they are. In other words, pointing to a requisite condition for purification is pointless, because conditioning will bring us there or not anyways. Even in saying it is pointless, I would be making no point at all, I just would exactly say what I had to.

Regards

[Elohim]

fofoo,

While one can probably refute most points of Gosalla by still holding to a concept of moral retribution, can one say if there is no controll, there still is a requisite condition for purification? Strictly speaking, if everything is conditioned, all conditions are requisite, because they cannot be other than they are. In other words, pointing to a requisite condition for purification is pointless, because conditioning will bring us there or not anyways. Even in saying it is pointless, I would be making no point at all, I just would exactly say what I had to.

Yes, I think we can say there are still requsite conditions without control. In the ultimate sense, control as we understand it is not needed in a conditional world. The purification of beings has its requsite conditions, as well as being a requsite condition itself. One cannot say, for example, let my Nibbana be thus, let my Nibbana not be thus, et cetera, nor can one say let me achieve Nibbana right now.

My understanding of this topic is impermanent; and as such, it changes depending upon the various circumstances surrounding it. Perhaps we can rid some of the confusion by removing the idea that cetanaa cetasika has choice as its function, and replacing it with the idea that it is just another action of mind.

There are many different ways in which we can look at this subject. One is to look at it from the conventional level of beings (satta). On that level, we (as in Jason, fofoo, et cetera) can make decisons, we can make chocies, et cetera. I walk into a store and I decide to buy tofu instead of beef for my curry dish.

On the ultimate level, who makes decisions, who makes choices? Did the Buddha teach of an unconditioned agent which chooses, decides, or controls? On the ultimate level, do we (as in Jason, fofoo, et cetera) exist? Can we be found? Is there something that we can point to and say this is me?

From my limited understanding, the answer in Theravada is no. The choice to walk into a store and the decision to purchase tofu instead of beef is not a choice that was made free from causes or conditions. There are causes and conditions for the particular store I chose, as well as for not buying the beef.

In the ultimate sense, how can there be choices, decisions, or control without a chooser, decider, or controller? To be honest, there might be, but I do not know what allows for this possibility in Abhidhamma since there is no agent or self by which a choice is made. There are only actions (kamma) born out of avijja.

Essentially, if the appropriate conditions for touching the Deathless are present, then one is able to transcend suffering; if the appropriate conditions are not present for touching the Deathless, then one is unable to transcend suffering. Pointing to the requsite conditions for purification is not pointless as that in itself may be a requsite needed for the arising of the factors for awakening (bojjhanga).

Jason

[masteravatardavidstar]

I believe that we have much more control over our lives than we give ourselves credit for having.

[Elohim]

Avatar,

I am sure we do, but how does this relate to what the Abhidhamma has to say (which is the context of this topic)?

Jason

[masteravatardavidstar]

Avatar,

I am sure we do, but how does this relate to what the Abhidhamma has to say (which is the context of this topic)?

Jason
Though as Buddhists we are taught that there is no"self"(spirit) and also no"Self" (Atman)this still does not negate the fact that eventhough the core being of ALL "reality"is emptiness - there is still the illusory "dream state" which we (the dreamers dreaming ourselves & our environment AS the dream) DO partake in on a level of perception which does in "fact" constitute what we collectively refer to as "controlled reality". Basically we are the lie telling the lie. Since "we"are the ones telling the lie / and yet "we" do not exist--does'nt it make sense that "we" are the ultimate "controllers of our own "reality.

[Iawa]

Don't tempt me.